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ABSTRACT  
   
This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better 
understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants 
learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-
understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, 
expert understanding led participants to believe that they personally understood the 
phenomenon, with expert understanding acting as a cue for trustworthiness and 
believability. This effect was particularly pronounced with low-quality sources. These 
results are discussed in the context of how information is used by jurors in court, and the 
implications of the “Community of Knowledge” effect being used by expert witnesses.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Sloman and Rabb (2016) proposed the existence of an effect, called the 
“community of knowledge” effect, or CK effect. The effect occurs when a person is told 
that another person understands how something works, and results in the person receiving 
this information to think that they also understand how it works without actually 
receiving an explanation. This newly-identified effect, in isolation, is a simple social-
cognitive psychology theory that explains how people rely on one another for 
information. However, when put into the legal context, the CK effect is an example of 
how unrelated information can influence decision-making in high-stakes legal cases. To 
explore the CK effect, a review of related literature will be discussed. Then, literature 
highlighting the consequences of such effects in legal decision-making will be reviewed. 
Lastly, an experiment further exploring the CK effect will be presented, including a 
discussion of the findings and future directions for other social and legal psychology 
researchers to consider. 
Community of Knowledge 
In the study by Sloman and Rabb, a series of within-group studies were conducted 
in which researchers presented participants with news briefs describing novel scientific 
findings and measured participants’ perceptions of understanding and ability to explain 
how the novel scientific finding worked following each news brief. The news briefs 
varied in the type of novel scientific finding that was discovered (e.g. triangular lightning, 
glowing rocks, humming stalactites), difficulty in understanding how the phenomenon 
worked (using statements of the scientific finding being easy or difficult to understand), 
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whether the discovering scientists understood and could explain how it worked (using 
statements of whether experts understood how the scientific finding worked), and 
accessibility of the information (e.g. information that was classified by the FBI or 
publicly available in a journal). 
Results demonstrated that participants were significantly more likely to perceive 
themselves as understanding how the novel scientific finding worked when they were 
told that discovering scientists understood and could explain how the scientific 
phenomenon worked. These results were stable across the different types of novel 
scientific findings and were moderated by the perceived accessibility of the novel 
scientific information – participants did not perceive themselves as able to understand 
how the novel scientific finding worked if they were told that such information was 
classified by the FBI (Sloman & Rabb, 2016).  
This effect, which they coined the “Community of Knowledge” effect, or CK 
effect, described the perception of understanding novel information to an extent where 
one could explain how it works, without having enough factual information to reasonably 
do so. In the original study, the effect persisted across multiple news briefs within 
participants. At first glance, this effect resembles that of the “illusion of explanatory 
depth,” as originally posited by Rozenblit and Keil (2002). The illusion of explanatory 
depth happens when participants are asked to explain a topic or idea they perceive 
themselves as knowledgeable on through an explanation task. After completing the 
explanation task, participants realize they are unable to explain their chosen topic as well 
as they originally thought. This results in high scores of perceived ability to understand 
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prior to the explanation task, and low scores of perceived ability to understand after the 
explanation task. The CK effect uses the same dependent variables and has similar 
outcomes as those in illusion of explanatory depth research. 
Despite these similarities, Sloman and Rabb (2016) did not address the potential 
for the effect to be susceptible to adjustment the way the illusion of explanatory depth is, 
suggesting the effect is more so a static bias than a perceptual cue. If this is the case, then 
other researchers should take interest in this finding, as it has implications for other 
contexts. If a person only needs another person to state that they understand and can 
explain something to feel that they also understand and can explain the same scientific 
information, people’s decision-making may be influenced this effect rather than by 
critical facts about the scientific information, such as whether the scientific information 
applied the scientific method and other possible explanations were ruled out.  
Before it described a social-cognitive effect, the “community of knowledge” 
referred to the philosophical idea that the meaning of words and concepts are developed 
within a community (Welbourne, 1981). In a review of John Locke’s theory on 
communication and meaning, Welbourne proposes the existence of ideas within a social 
framework dependent upon trustworthiness and believability. According to Putnam 
(1975), in order for an idea to gain meaning within a community, it must draw on its very 
essence or core idea (Medin & Ortony, 1989), and one’s outside knowledge of the idea 
(Wilson, 2002). Thus, Welbourne’s theory is a synthesis of these concepts.  
 Empirical evidence of this concept dates back as early as 1987, when participating 
couples completed a task in which they gave instructions on how to complete everyday 
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tasks, such as changing the oil on a vehicle (Wegner, 1987). In doing so, the partner who 
perceived themselves as less knowledgeable about the task relied on their partner to give 
instructions. For example, when asked to explain how to change a car’s oil, the female 
partner relied on the male partner to give instruction, as the female partner perceived the 
male partner as more knowledgeable about the given task (Wegner, 1987). Further, 
participant groups tasked with recalling words or other information were observed 
relying upon other participants in the group to recall the information that they themselves 
could not remember (Wegner, 1995). A limitation to these findings is that participants’ 
dependence upon their peers could be interpreted as social loafing, however if 
participants exerted the same effort into the memory recall as their peers, this point would 
be moot.  
 Support for the community of knowledge was demonstrated not only in memory 
recall tasks, but also in explanatory tasks, such as that used by Fernbach and colleagues 
(Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013). Participants answered questions about their 
tendencies toward political extremism and understanding of various social policies, then 
wrote a detailed explanation of a social policy that they reported being knowledgeable 
about. After doing so, participants again rated political extremism and understanding. 
Results demonstrated that participants’ ratings of understanding lowered, as they realized 
that they could not fully explain the social policy that they had personally endorsed their 
understanding of. Additionally, results demonstrated lower rates of political extremism 
after the explanation exercise, highlighting the potential consequences of such tasks on 
personal attitudes.  
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 Although there is evidence supporting the existence of a community of 
knowledge, there are competing theories that could potentially explain findings in 
Community of Knowledge research. For example, there is research supporting the idea 
that people develop their own self-concept based on information from others. Goldstein 
& Cialdini (2007) primed participants to identify with an actor, during which time they 
observed the actor’s behavior during the study. After completing this task, participants 
then answered questions about their own attributes and self-concept. Results 
demonstrated that participants incorporated attributes of the actor into their own self-
concept when they were primed to identify with the actor.  
These results are similar to those found by Sloman and Rabb (2016) in that they 
both demonstrate situations in which people incorporate another person’s traits or 
knowledge into their own traits or knowledge. Goldstein and Cialdini (2007) argue that 
this occurs because people infer their own attributes by observing other people with 
whom they have a merged identity, such as friends or family with whom they have things 
in common. Applying this theory to the CK study, participants’ increased perceptions of 
understanding and ability to explain would be the result of identifying with the 
researchers that discovered the novel scientific finding, the university they study at, or 
even the publishing source of the finding, and then adopting the knowledge into one’s 
own attributes or self-concept.   
 Considering existing literature and findings by Sloman and Rabb (2016) together, 
two research questions emerge: is the CK effect a reliable effect, and is it susceptible to 
peripheral cues the same way other decision-making processes are?  
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The Elaboration Likelihood Model 
The elaboration likelihood model as originally posited by Petty and Cacioppo 
(cited in Petty & Brinol, 2012) is a split-pathway framework within which people make 
decisions and change attitudes. The model is created on the foundation that people 
effectively make decisions or change their attitude based on their motivation and ability 
to do so. 
One pathway within which the ELM operates is the central pathway. When a 
person is highly interested in a topic, they are motivated to be informed on it and more 
likely to pay attention to factual information, or central cues, which would help them 
make an informed decision on the topic. Additionally, when someone is able to make an 
effective decision because they are well-rested, focused, and can understand the 
information, they are more likely to use central cues, as they are relevant to their 
decision. 
The second pathway within which the ELM operates, the peripheral pathway, 
states that when someone is not motivated to make an informed decision on a topic, or 
there are circumstances making them less able to make an informed decision, they rely on 
peripheral cues to make decisions. Peripheral cues include information that is irrelevant 
to the decision being made. For example, when deciding on which realtor to use in selling 
a house, peripheral cues would include details like the amount of smiling the realtor did 
or the color of their blouse, as opposed to the number of homes they have sold and their 
reputation around town. 
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 Early studies on the elaboration likelihood model demonstrated the use of cues 
that are peripheral, or aside from the primary information needed, in decision making. 
One study explored the use of information quality as a cue and found that attitudes 
regarding an argument topic were stronger and more-supported in study conditions that 
were high-thinking versus low-thinking (Petty et al., 1981 as cited in Petty & Brinol, 
2012). Further, information on the source quality (whether the argument was made by an 
educational publication from a university compared to a local high school student’s 
essay) mattered less in high-thinking conditions.  
Similar studies in legal settings suggest similar uses of peripheral cues in legal 
decision making. For example, one study aimed to explore whether testimony delivery (in 
person or through closed-caption television) influenced jurors’ ability to make an 
informed decision regarding the case (Orcutt et al., 2001). Results indicated that 
regardless of the testimony delivery type, jurors were less likely to convict the defendant 
when they detected deception in the child’s testimony. In this study, testimony delivery 
type was used as a peripheral cue while child detection was used as a central cue. 
Testimony delivery did not influence rational legal decision-making, suggesting that 
testimony delivery type does not act as a peripheral cue the same way source quality did 
in previous studies. 
Another study explored evidence testimony type and its influence on jury decision 
making (McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). These researchers found that jurors were 
more likely to believe a piece of forensic evidence came from the defendant when it was 
presented using different styles of forensic science testimony. Some styles of forensic 
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science testimony included providing jurors with a statement that the evidence is a match 
or a statement that the evidence is “similar in all microscopic characteristics.” earchers 
also found that jurors who believed the forensic evidence came from the defendant were 
more likely to view the evidence as incriminating. In this study, the type of forensic 
science testimony (different ways of delivering the same evidence) was the peripheral 
cue, as it led to differences in belief of where the evidence came from, and how 
incriminating the evidence was.  
Legal Context 
If the CK effect is in fact a static bias, as the research suggests thus far, there are 
implications depending on the context within which the effect is found. In criminal court 
trials, jury members and judges are present to make legal decisions regarding the case 
and the defendant (U.S. Const. Amend. VI). In making these decisions, jury members and 
judges rely on testimony evidence to make informed decisions about a criminal court 
case. Testimony evidence can come from a variety of people, including victims, 
witnesses, and experts in relevant fields. 
Expert witnesses, as defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence (2000), is a person 
who serves as a witness in a case that is qualified as an expert through their education, 
experience, training, skill, or knowledge in a topic that is scientific or otherwise in nature. 
If the expert’s specialized knowledge will help the jury and judge understand the case or 
determine facts, they are permitted to testify - assuming their testimony is based on a 
sufficient amount of data or facts and is the product or application of sound principles 
and methods (Federal Rules of Evidence, 2000). 
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When expert witnesses are permitted to testify, they are only permitted to provide 
opinions that can help determine facts – they cannot provide actual answers to legal 
questions, such as whether the defendant was insane at the time of the offense or if the 
defendant should be found guilty of the crime. Because of their specialized nature and 
unique roles within a court case, expert witnesses have the responsibility of presenting 
information that is novel to jurors, complicated in nature, or specific to their own 
expertise. This makes juror understanding and interpretation of the evidence difficult, to 
the point where some jurors or judges, also known as fact finders, are unable to 
understand the testimony evidence. 
Fact Finders 
Judges and jury members act as fact finders in criminal court cases, where they 
make decisions of guilt based on the facts of the case (U.S. Const. Amend. VI). Facts of 
the case are presented by those representing either the prosecution or the defense in a 
case, as well as the witnesses testifying in the case. Fact finders are trusted to determine 
facts effectively with the information they are presented; however, evidence suggests that 
effective decision-making as a jury member, and as a judge, is harder than one would 
hope.  
 A judge’s role in a case is to determine evidence admissibility if it is challenged 
by one of the sides, either the prosecution or the defense, of the case (Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 2000). If the evidence of a case is deemed relevant and trustworthy, the 
evidence is presented during trial, where both judge and juror determine the facts of the 
case. Two hallmark cases resulted in case law providing guidance for judges to determine 
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evidence admissibility. One case, Frye v. United States (1923), set the earliest precedent 
for evidence admissibility. The courts ruled that scientific evidence must be “generally 
accepted” within its scientific community to be admitted into a trial. The case law 
provided structure for judges to ensure unreliable or poor scientific testimony was 
rejected from court cases. Shortcomings of the “Frye test” included its inability to allow 
new, but reliable, scientific evidence or methods into court (Billings, 2001). 
The Federal Rules of Evidence, originally written in 1975, later recommended 
new guidelines for evidence admissibility in federal courts, setting forth more specific 
standards that would further limit the amount of bad scientific evidence being permitted 
into court and modeling effective evidence admissibility guidelines for other jurisdictions 
(Billings, 2001). Although these guidelines were strong and theory-based, they were not 
binding for judges and jurisdictions outside of the federal level, such as city and state 
courts. 
 The second case to determine evidence admissibility guidelines for judges was 
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993). The case decision affirmed the 
guidelines originally published in the Federal Rules of Evidence (2000) and instructed 
judges on how to act as a “gatekeeper” of evidence for the courtroom to attempt to 
protect jurors from being exposed to poor science. The decision outlined four criteria for 
judges to consider when evaluating scientific evidence admissibility: the scientific 
method or fact needs to be 1) tested, reliable, and valid, 2) accepted by the scientific 
community in which it is used, 3) subjected to a peer-review process, and 4) have an error 
rate that is within an acceptable range. 
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 Under the most recent precedent for determining evidence admissibility, judges 
have clearer guidelines on what should be admitted, protecting other fact finders from 
being exposed to information that would unfairly influence their decisions. However, 
according to Kovera and McAuliff (2000), the precedent is not effective in protecting 
jurors from flawed science on its own. A study was conducted to determine judges’ 
ability to make evidence admissibility decisions using admissibility standards, 
particularly when flawed science was present, and when the judge had some type of 
formal scientific training (e.g. taken a graduate-level science course, completed a 
Continuing Education course on scientific methods). Researchers found that only 17% of 
judges allowed scientifically valid testimony into trial that judges with formal scientific 
training had higher admissibility ratings for the scientifically valid testimony, and judges 
with no formal scientific training had higher admissibility ratings for the scientifically 
flawed testimony.  
 Given that judges continue to have difficulty with effective decision making after 
receiving clear guidelines on how to do so, there is evidence of other factors influencing 
decision-making. As mentioned previously, peripheral cues are an example of other 
factors that may lead to less effective decision making when people, in this case fact 
finders, are unable or unmotivated to use effective decision-making techniques. 
Expert Testimony and Juror Bias 
Despite efforts by expert witnesses to maintain the objectivity of their testimony, 
juror and judge bias cause undue influences on decisions made using expert testimony 
evidence. In civil court cases, it is evident that expert race and gender influence the 
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persuasiveness of the expert’s testimony (Memon & Shuman, 1998). After reviewing the 
summary, audiotapes, and slide presentations of a case, jurors were most persuaded by 
black female experts’ testimony. Although this particular study’s results are not 
consistent with similar study results on the influence of witness gender and race on 
persuasion, it demonstrates the potential for jurors to be influenced by information 
irrelevant to the expert’s credibility. Additionally, eye contact behavior can influence 
juror perceptions of expert credibility (Neal & Brodsky, 2008). Participants watched a 
video portraying an expert reading a trial expert, the videos differing by expert gender 
and amount of eye contact used by the expert (low, medium, high). Jurors indicated that 
experts with high eye contact, irrespective of gender, was perceived as more credible.  
 Evidence suggests that even different types of testimony evidence – such as 
testimony on particular psychological theories – elicit stereotype biases that influence 
juror decisions. Schuller and Vidmar (1992) demonstrated that battered woman syndrome 
evidence reminds jurors of the stereotyped “battered woman,” leading to juror decisions 
based off of the stereotyped concept of a battered woman as opposed to the defendant’s 
unique case and facts provided in the testimony.  
Different testimony styles – such as the way in which an expert ties research back 
into the trial case – can influence the way jurors make a decision on the case. Juror 
participants received group probability data from an expert witness’s testimony in a rape 
case, with the testimony varying in whether it connected the group probability data back 
to the trial case (Brekke & Borgida, 1988). Participants used the group probability data 
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from the testimony most when the expert connected the group probability data back to the 
trial case, particularly when this was done earlier in the testimony as opposed to later.  
 The effects of some types of evidence have not been clearly supported by 
research, as their effect on fact finder decisions appear unclear. Neuroevidence, for 
example, was originally thought to have an unusually persuasive power over jury 
members when used in expert testimony (McCabe & Castel, 2008). Researchers 
presented participants with brain images and the trial content in a script, then measured 
expert witness credibility. Results indicated that the presence of brain images resulted in 
an increase in expert witness credibility. Later studies demonstrated the general lack of 
such an effect in both replication and original study designs (Schweitzer, Baker, & Risko 
(2013).  
 Testimony complexity can serve as a central cue in jury decision making, as it 
changes the ability of jurors to make effective decisions. After viewing a trial video 
including scientific evidence presented by experts, participants reported being more 
persuaded by an expert’s professional credentials, such as degree and certifications, when 
the expert’s testimony was complex (Cooper et al., 1996). Another study resulted in an 
interaction between expert gender and testimony complexity was found when participants 
evaluated a civil case involving an antitrust price-fixing agreement (Schuller, Terry, & 
McKimmie, 2005). Mock jurors found the male expert to be more persuasive when the 
expert’s testimony was complex, and the female expert more persuasive when the 
expert’s testimony was simple. 
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 Although expert witnesses are not at fault for the biases of others, it is critical that 
experts understand biases so that they can be accounted for in one’s testimony. When 
experts neglect to incorporate bias research into their testimony evidence, they risk 
misinterpretation of their novel, complex testimony – which can lead to ineffective, 
permanent decisions. 
Current Study 
To answer the questions posed herein, an online survey was created to measure 
the effects of expert understanding and source quality on perceptions of understanding, 
ability to explain, trust, and believability of a novel scientific finding. The study 
hypotheses included the following: 1) participants’ perceived understanding and ability to 
explain a novel scientific finding will increase when an expert claims to understand and 
have the ability to explain how a novel scientific finding works, 2) participants’ 
perceptions of source trustworthiness and believability will increase when the novel 
scientific finding is published in an academic journal compared to a local newspaper, and 
3) the CK effect will be stronger when the novel scientific finding is published in an 
academic journal compared to a local newspaper.  
The scenario in which experts report understanding how the phenomenon works 
should elicit an increase in participants’ perceived understanding and ability to explain 
the phenomenon compared to the scenario in which experts report not understanding how 
the phenomenon works, despite participants not having any additional information as to 
how the phenomenon actually works - supporting the presence of the CK effect.  
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The source quality, a local newspaper compared to an academic journal, is 
expected to influence the CK effect for several reasons. In the Sloman and Rabb study, it 
was determined that the CK effect was stronger when participants were told that the 
concept was easier to understand, compared to when participants were told that it was 
difficult to understand. This supports the idea that the CK effect, and related decisions 
made by participants, utilize the ELM framework, as the effect was weaker when 
participants were less able to understand the information. Given the CK effect’s 
susceptibility to cues, it would be expected that the comparing a vetted, scientifically 
supported publication to a non-scientific, entertainment publication would act as a 
peripheral cue, further influencing decision making when the CK effect is present. If 
participants use the source quality as a peripheral cue to make decisions regarding the 
scientific finding, then participants would have higher ratings on various dependent 
measures when the source is an academic journal compared to the local newspaper, as it 
provides peripheral information on whether the source should be believed and trusted. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
Design 
Study participants were presented with a set of brief newspaper-style briefs 
describing a novel, fictitious scientific finding. The news briefs varied in three ways: the 
expert’s reported understanding of the novel scientific finding, the brief’s publishing 
source quality, and the type of scientific finding. This resulted in a 2 (Phenomenon: 
melting rocks, humming stalactites) x 2 (Understanding: no, yes) x 2 (Publishing source: 
local newspaper, academic journal) partial mixed factors design. After reading each brief, 
participants answered a set of items about their understanding of, belief in, and 
perceptions of the scientific finding. Lastly, participants answered demographic 
questions.  
Participants 
Participants were collected using Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing 
software. A total of N = 300 participants were included in the original sample. Nine 
participants were removed from the original sample because they completed the survey in 
less than 90 seconds, resulting in a final sample of N = 291 participants. A power 
analysis on the highest effect anticipated, a mixed methods two-way interaction, 
determined a minimum sample size of N = 150 needed to detect an effect size 
comparable to those detected in analyses by Sloman and Rabb (2016) (an effect size of η2 
= 0.05 or higher), with a sufficient amount of statistical power (0.80 or better) (Cohen, 
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1988). Based on this calculation, the final sample size exceeded the minimum sample 
size needed. 
The sample consisted of 44.7% female participants, with an average age of 34.71 
years old. About 36.4% of the participants had a four-year college degree, and the racial 
demographic of the group consisted of 71.5% Caucasian/White, 9.6% Asian/Pacific 
Islander, 8.2% African American, 7.2% Hispanic/Latino, 0.3% Middle East/North 
African, and 3.1% identified as “other.”  
In addition to traditional Amazon M-Turk features, add-on TurkPrime software 
was used to reach a more representative sample (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). 
This is accomplished using several features exclusive to TurkPrime, including more 
specific participation criteria, excluding participants who have participated in previous 
surveys, and administering the survey to smaller groups of participants over a longer 
amount of time, allowing a wider variety of M-Turk workers to complete the same 
survey.  
Materials 
To create the study, a series of newspaper-style briefs were written. Each news 
brief described a novel, fictitious scientific finding that was being researched by experts 
at a public university. Half of the news briefs contained a fictitious scientific finding 
directly adapted from Sloman and Rabb’s experimental materials (2016). In order to 
replicate and extend their findings, a new scientific finding was created in the same style 
and included in the present survey. 
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The first manipulation, the fictitious scientific finding, was included to primarily 
test replication of findings from Sloman and Rabb (2016). Fake scientific phenomena 
were used in both studies, including the concepts of “humming stalactites” and “melting 
rocks.” Fake phenomena were used versus real scientific findings to ensure that 
participants did not have any pre-existing knowledge or understanding of the novel 
information presented. The scenario adapted from the Sloman and Rabb study described 
stalactites that hum, while the scenario created for this specific study, styled after that by 
Sloman and Rabb, described rocks that turn into a liquid state (melted) when wet. In both 
conditions, this phenomenon variable was represented by two sentences describing the 
discovery of the phenomenon. The entire news brief, and the alternative version of this 
manipulation, is included in Appendix A. An example: 
A June 26, 2015, study in the local newspaper Billings Herald reported the 
discovery of a cave formation that scientists have thoroughly explained. The 
authors of the study, Danica and Frith, gave a description of the unusual 
formation: The otherwise ordinary stalactites generate a continuous 
humming sound without being touched. 
 
The second manipulation, expert understanding, varied whether or not the 
scientists in each scenario understood how the phenomenon worked. Half of the scenarios 
stated the scientists who discovered the phenomenon fully understood and could explain 
how it works. For example, one version of the manipulation stated: “The authors fully 
understand how they work and went on to provide a complete explanation of the 
underlying process.” The other scenario stated the scientists who discovered the 
phenomenon did not understand, and could not explain, how it works. To ensure a 
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successful replication, the language for this manipulation was directly adapted from 
examples of the briefs used by Sloman and Rabb (2016).  
The last manipulation in the study, publishing source quality, was included to 
measure the extent to which the CK effect would be influenced by the peripheral cue of 
source quality. The first level, low-quality source, was represented by a local newspaper, 
while the high-quality source was represented by an academic journal that published the 
novel scientific finding. The manipulation was included in the scenario using one 
sentence, which stated the type of publication source that reported the newly discovered 
phenomenon, for example: “A June 26, 2015, study in the local newspaper Billings 
Herald reported the discovery of a cave formation that scientists have thoroughly 
explained.” 
Next, a small survey was constructed for participants to complete after viewing 
each news brief to measure all dependent measures in the study. A demographics 
questionnaire was created for the end of the survey, where participants would provide 
basic information about themselves. Participants were presented with a series of 
questions after reading each news brief. Each series of questions included measures 
adapted from the Sloman and Rabb (2016) study, including questions of participants’ 
perceived understanding of the phenomenon, perceived ability to explain how the 
phenomenon works, and if participants believed they received an actual explanation of 
how the scientific phenomenon worked. We also asked participants to indicate the extent 
to which they trusted the publication source and their perceived believability of the 
phenomenon.   
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Questions regarding participants’ opinions of scientific information were included 
at the end of the survey to measure individual differences in attitudes about science. Two 
of the questions targeted participants’ beliefs on scientific endeavors and scientists’ 
responsibility to innovate and discover, for example: “In your own personal opinion, how 
important is it for ‘scientists’ to…discover new things?” The other two questions targeted 
a participants’ beliefs on how knowledgeable or intelligent scientists should be regarding 
what they discover or study, for example: “In your own personal opinion, how important 
is it for ‘scientists’ to…understand why something happens?” The questions were based 
on a 7-point Likert type scale. Questions regarding a participant’s age, level of education, 
sex, political orientation, ethnicity, and state of residency were included at the end of the 
survey. All dependent measures presented to participants can be viewed in Appendix B.  
Procedure 
Participants were recruited through Amazon M-Turk, and were asked to 
participate in a survey for monetary compensation, a total of $0.60 for an estimated 5-10 
minutes of their time. Participants were then directed to an online survey created using 
Qualtrics software. After reviewing an informed consent describing participants’ 
voluntary participation and minimal anticipated risks as a result, participants were then 
presented with the first block of the survey, including one of eight randomized news 
briefs. Participants read the news brief, then answered the set of questions for that 
specific news brief.  
After completing the first block of the survey, participants were then presented 
with the “opposite” news brief of the first one viewed in the second block of the survey. 
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The opposite news brief is another one of the eight news briefs created, however all of 
the manipulations for the second news brief are the opposite of the first. For example, if 
the participant first read a news brief published in a local newspaper describing humming 
stalactites that experts understood and could explain, the second news brief viewed would 
be published in an academic journal describing melting rocks that experts did not 
understand and could not explain. Participants then completed the same set of dependent 
measures for the second news brief, resulting in each participant providing ratings for two 
of the eight possible scenarios. Following the second block of the study, participants 
answered scientific and demographic questions, and they received a code for monetary 
compensation for their participation.                             
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Analysis 
For each dependent measure – both in the first and second blocks – descriptive 
statistics were calculated to explore the distribution of each measure. Most measures fell 
within the acceptable range of skewness and kurtosis (between -2.00 and +2.00), with the 
exception of a few variables.  
Participants’ ratings of perceived understanding after reading the rock condition 
M = 1.62 SD = 1.01 was marginally kurtotic, with a kurtosis statistic of 1.98 SE = 0.40. 
Participants’ ratings of perceived ability to explain the phenomenon after reading the rock 
condition M = 1.62 SD = 1.07 was marginally positively skewed, with a statistic of 1.93 
SE = 0.20 and excessively kurtotic, with a statistic of 3.09 SE = 0.40. Lastly, participants’ 
ratings of having received an actual explanation after reading the rock condition M = 0.49 
SD = 0.50 was excessively kurtotic, with a statistic of -2.03 SE = 0.40.  
 Participants’ ratings of perceived understanding after reading the stalactites 
condition, M = 1.57 SD = 0.96, was marginally kurtotic with a statistic of 1.89 SE = 0.40. 
Participants’ ratings of perceived ability to explain how the phenomenon works after 
reading the stalactite condition, M = 1.48 SD = 0.92, was excessively positively skewed 
with a statistic of 2.02 SE = 0.20 and excessively kurtotic with a statistic of 3.44 SE = 
0.40. Lastly, participants’ ratings of having received an actual explanation, M = 0.50 SD 
= 0.50, was excessively kurtotic with a statistic of -2.03 SE = 0.40.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent 
Measures* 
 
DV M SD 
Rock Scenario   
Perceived understanding 1.62 1.01 
Perceived ability to explain 1.62 1.07 
Believability 2.30 1.17 
Trustworthiness 2.61 1.20 
Received explanation 0.49 0.50 
Stalactites Scenario   
Perceived understanding 1.57 0.96 
Perceived ability to explain 1.48 0.92 
Believability 2.83 1.06 
Trustworthiness 3.01 1.02 
Received Explanation 0.50 0.50 
*measures ranged from 1-7 on a Likert scale 
 
To prepare for analysis, the data was collapsed across the phenomenon variable 
(as it was included for replication purposes and not for the primary hypotheses) and 
responses for the second block were reverse-coded. The hypothesized effects for the 
second block were always the opposite of the first block, making data analysis simpler by 
using reverse-coding. After reverse-coding the dependent measures in the second block, 
the meaning of each dependent measure is different. Before, higher scores on the 
dependent measures (e.g. to what extent do you understand how this phenomenon 
works?) represented higher scores of understanding. After reverse-coding the second 
block, higher scores on the dependent measures represented a bigger difference in a 
participant’s scores of understanding between the first and second block.  
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Figure 1: Interpretation of Results After Reverse-Coding 
 
 
 
 
 
Expert Understanding 
An ANOVA test was performed to measure the effect of expert understanding on 
perceived understanding of the phenomenon. Results indicated that there was a bigger 
difference in perceived understanding scores that corresponded with the change in 
manipulations, from when the expert understood the phenomenon (M = 3.11 SE = .05) to 
when the expert did not understand the phenomenon (M = 2.70 SE = .05) F(1, 287) = 
40.64 p < .001 η2 = .12. In other words, this finding demonstrated a successful replication 
of the CK effect.  
  
High vs. low scores in 
perceived understanding 
Big vs. small difference in 
perceived understanding  
Reverse-coding process 
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Table 2: Main Effects of Expert Understanding on Participants’ Perceptions of Novel 
Information 
DV F(df) p η2 
Perceived understanding 40.64(1) > .001 .12 
Perceived ability to explain 30.98(1) > .001 .10 
Believability 27.40(1) 
 
> .001 .09 
Trustworthiness 23.76(1) > .001 .10 
 
Further testing revealed that participants’ scores of perceived ability to explain 
how the phenomenon worked were significantly higher when they were told experts 
understood and could explain how it works (M = 3.09 SE = 0.05) compared to when they 
were told experts did not understand and could not explain how it works (M = 2.72 SE = 
.05), F(1, 287) = 30.98 p < .001 η2 = .10. Testing also revealed significantly bigger 
differences in scores of participants’ belief that the phenomenon they read about actually 
took place when experts understood the novel scientific finding (M = 3.13 SE = .06) than 
when experts did not understand (M = 2.73 SE = .05) F(1, 288) = 27.48 p < .001 η2 = .09. 
This demonstrates the influence of someone else’s reported understanding on 
participants’ personal belief that the scientific finding actually took place. 
 An alternative explanation to this result is that participants misinterpreted the 
description of the phenomenon as an actual explanation of how the novel scientific 
finding worked in the news brief. To measure this, the effect of expert understanding was 
measured on the variable of perceptions of having received an actual explanation. Results 
indicated a significant difference in scores of perceptions of receiving an explanation, in 
that there was a smaller difference in scores of having received an explanation when 
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experts did not understand the novel scientific finding (M = 2.54 SE = .06) than when 
experts understood the novel scientific finding (M = 3.21 SE = .06) F(1, 288) = 66.04 p < 
.001 η2 = .19. If participants misinterpreted the scientific finding’s description as an 
explanation, then there would be no difference in perceptions of receiving an actual 
explanation between conditions. Therefore, participants reported higher rates of 
understanding, ability to explain, and belief that they received an explanation of how the 
novel scientific finding worked when they were told experts understood how it worked, 
even though no actual explanation was provided.  
Source Quality 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to measure the source quality manipulation 
and any main effects on the primary dependent variables.  
The ANOVA test results indicated there were no main effects of source quality on 
perceived understanding (p = .56), perceived ability to explain (p = .78), or believability 
of the novel scientific finding (p = .46).  This finding suggests that either the 
manipulation was not strong enough to elicit differences of trust in the source, or the 
presence of expert understanding acts as a proxy for the source quality, rather than the 
actual source. To test this, a test on the manipulation check variable revealed there was 
no significant difference in perceived trustworthiness depending on the source quality 
F(1, 289) = 1.19 p = .28 η2 = .004, suggesting that the manipulations were indeed not 
strong enough to elicit differences in trust when comparing a local news article to an 
academic journal. 
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Table 3: Main Effects of Source Quality on Participants’ Perceptions of Novel 
Information 
DV F(df) p η2 
Perceived understanding 0.33(1) .56 .001 
Perceived ability to explain 0.08(1) .78 >  .001 
Believability 0.55(1) .46 .002 
Trustworthiness 1.00(1) .32 .003 
 
Expert Understanding vs. Source Quality 
A two-way ANOVA test revealed an interaction between expert understanding 
and publication source quality on perceived understanding F (1, 287) = 6.85 p = .009     
η2 = .02. Publication source quality appeared to moderate the effect of expert 
understanding on participant perceived understanding. When the publishing source 
quality is low, the CK effect is significant, with lower scores of perceived understanding 
when experts didn’t understand the scientific finding (M = 2.60 SE = .06) and higher 
scores of perceived understanding when experts understood the scientific finding (M = 
3.18 SE = .07) F(1, 143) = 33.32 p < .001 η2 = .19. When the publishing source quality is 
high, the CK effect is in the same direction, but weaker, with lower scores of perceived 
understanding when experts did not understand the scientific finding (M = 2.81 SE = .06) 
and higher scores of perceived understanding when experts understood the scientific 
finding (M = 3.05 SE = .06), F(1, 144) = 8.94 p = .003 η2 = .06.  
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There was no interaction between publishing source quality and expert 
understanding on perceived ability to explain (p = .16) or perceived believability (p = 
.16). There was a marginal two-way interaction between source quality and expert 
understanding on trustworthiness F(1, 287) = 3.00 p = .08 η2 = .01. There was a simple 
effect of expert understanding on perceived understanding when the source quality is low 
F(1, 143) = 29.92 p < .001 η2 = .17, in that differences in scores of perceived 
trustworthiness were lower when the experts did not understand the scientific finding (M 
= 2.70 SE = .07) than when experts understood the scientific finding (M = 3.23 SE = .07). 
There was also a weaker simple effect of expert understanding on perceived 
trustworthiness when the source quality is high F(1, 144) = 6.95 p = .01 η2 = .05, such 
that differences in scores of perceived trustworthiness were lower when experts did not 
understand the scientific finding (M = 2.90 SD = .08) than when the experts understood 
the scientific finding (M = 3.18 SD = .08).  
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Phenomenon 
An ANOVA test was performed to measure the effects of the phenomenon 
variable on perceptions of understanding, ability to explain, trustworthiness, and 
believability. The phenomenon variable was not included as a primary independent 
variable because it was included only to ensure replicability of the CK effect using new 
stimuli.  
There was a significant main effect of phenomenon on perceived ability to 
explain, in that the differences of scores in perceptions of ability to explain decreased 
from the melting rock phenomenon (M = 2.98 SE = .05) to the humming stalactites 
phenomenon (M = 2.84 SE = .05), F(1, 283) = 4.60 p = .03 η2 = .02. There was also a 
significant main effect on perceived trustworthiness which increased from the melting 
rocks condition (M = 2.86 SE = 05) to the humming stalactites condition (M = 3.15 SE = 
.05), F(1, 283) = 17.22 p < .001 η2 = .06. Lastly, there was a significant main effect on 
believability, in that differences of scores in perceived believability that the phenomenon 
actually happened increased from the melting rock condition (M = 2.73 SE = .05) to the 
humming stalactite condition (M = 3.14 SE = .05), F(1, 283) = 30.91 p < .001 η2 = .10. 
A significant two-way interaction emerged between phenomenon and expert 
understanding on perceptions of understanding F(1, 283) = 4.19 p = .042 η2 = .015. When 
participants viewed the melting rock condition, differences of scores in perceptions of 
understanding increased from when they were told the expert did not understand (M = 
2.68 SE = 0.06) to when they were told the expert understood (M = 3.22 SE = .07) F(1, 
144) = 30.03 p = .001 η2 = .17. When participants viewed the humming stalactite 
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condition, there was a smaller, less significant difference between conditions when the 
expert did not understand (M = 2.72 SE = .06) and the expert understood (M = 3.01 SE = 
.06) F(1, 143) = 11.60 p < .001 η2 = .08. There were no significant interactions between 
phenomenon type and expert understanding or source quality on perceived ability to 
understand (p = .65), source trustworthiness (p = .19), or believability (p = .43). 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
Factfinders, such as judges and jurors, are responsible for making informed legal 
decisions regarding a case (U.S. Const. Amend. VI). When expert testimony is easy to 
understand, and when conditions are favorable to jurors and their ability to process 
information, they are effective in detecting truthful, objective information (Cooper et al., 
1996; cited in Petty & Brinol, 2012). When expert testimony is difficult to understand, 
when conditions make it difficult for jurors to reason, and when peripheral information is 
present, it is difficult for jurors to make informed decisions without being persuaded by 
extralegal information (e.g. Cooper, Bennett, & Sukel, 1996; Memon & Shuman, 1998; 
Neal & Brodsky, 2008).  
The current study measured participants’ perceptions of novel, fictitious scientific 
findings and demonstrated that participants had higher ratings of perceived 
understanding, ability to explain, trustworthiness, and believability of the novel scientific 
finding when experts reported they understood and could explain the phenomenon, 
supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, and providing evidence for the CK effect. It appears that 
the CK effect includes not only higher rates of perceived understanding, but higher rates 
of perceived ability to explain novel information, trust in the source, and belief that the 
phenomenon actually happened. Hypothesis 3 was also supported, however not in the 
predicted direction: results indicated a two-way interaction between expert’s reported 
understanding of the novel scientific finding and the article’s publishing source quality, 
in that a low source quality (a local newspaper) resulted in a stronger CK effect than 
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when the article’s publishing source quality was high (an academic journal). The third 
hypothesis predicted that the CK effect would be stronger when the novel scientific 
finding was published in an academic journal, however results indicated the opposite. 
This finding suggests the existence of the CK effect and its foundation in the ELM 
theory, however it is unclear whether source quality acts as a peripheral cue to source 
trustworthiness. There is potential for alternative explanations to the findings. 
Perceptions of understanding the novel scientific finding may be present overall, 
and under some conditions higher, because of participants’ “impression management,” or 
desire to appear smart. If this were the case, participants would score higher on measures 
of understanding or ability to explain when they are told an expert understands and can 
explain it because they want to appear smart, rather than because it reflects their true 
perceptions. When a participant is told that an expert does not understand how something 
works and can’t explain it, they would be less likely to engage in impression management 
because even an expert does not understand how it works – so their lack of understanding 
will not make them appear less smart.  
Another potential explanation for the findings is that publishing source quality 
acts as evidence for a community that participants relate to, rather than a peripheral cue. 
According to the community of knowledge and illusion of explanatory depth theories, 
participants need to perceive a shared identity or community with the source of 
information to have higher perceptions of understanding. If participants perceived 
themselves as sharing the community for which the local newspaper served, rather than 
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evaluating its quality, this would result in similar increases in perceived understanding 
compared to the academic journal. 
Criticisms to the study range from applicability to the legal setting and the 
potential for alternative explanations. Because this study did not use a legal scenario or 
trial-based information, it is unclear if the CK effect would apply to expert testimony. It 
is still possible, given that research has demonstrated the existence of social psychology 
theories and effects, such as the elaboration likelihood model or various biases, in legal 
contexts, however the answer to this question remains unclear. The current study also 
used an M-Turk worker sample, which has received criticism in recent research.  
Despite recent concerns about the effectiveness or quality of data that Amazon M-
Turk workers produce, research continues to demonstrate that the benefits of using M-
Turk worker data outweigh the weaknesses. Benefits include the cost effectiveness and 
sample diversity, while weaknesses include self-selected participants and falsified data by 
dishonest participants (Sheehan, 2017). In a review of M-Turk software and resulting 
data, critics were reminded that self-selected participants and falsified data by 
participants are inherent risks in online data, and therefore should not be used to discredit 
the continued use of M-Turk worker data (Sheehan, 2017). This is especially the case 
considering M-Turk data exceeds the diversity of data collected from university student 
samples, as demonstrated by Sheehan (2017). Similarly, research has demonstrated that 
Amazon M-Turk data differs only slightly from university-based or other online samples 
in quality, and maintains a level of diversity that some of the other samples do not meet 
when compared to M-Turk workers (Bartneck et al., 2015).  
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Another criticism is that in both the current study and that by Sloman and Rabb 
(2016) and other potentially explanatory theories, including impression management and 
the illusion of explanatory depth, were not considered when creating dependent 
measures. Thus, it is possible that the CK effect is not an effect in itself, but rather 
evidence for the illusion of explanatory depth before participants have an opportunity to 
explain their understanding, and then confirm that they do not understand as much as 
they originally thought. Similarly, the CK effect could be the product of impression 
management and would decrease after participants have the opportunity to express their 
intelligence and ability to understand scientific information before being exposed to 
novel information. 
To address criticisms and further research on the CK effect, future directions 
could include applying a similar study design to a legal setting to measure its 
applicability to a different context, and to replicate the present study including measures 
on impression management. Future study designs would utilize a trial-scenario, a 
deliberation task with a random community sample, and present participants with a self-
affirmation task prior to reading the first news brief, eliminating the need for impression 
management to occur and ruling out potential effects from participants’ desire to appear 
smart. To measure the amount of overlap between the CK effect and the illusion of 
explanatory depth, future study designs would ask participants to explain how the novel 
scientific finding works by either explaining it to a research assistant or writing it down. 
Research on the illusion of explanatory depth used similar tasks to correct inflated ratings 
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of understanding. Such studies could reveal whether the CK effect is an extension of the 
illusion of explanatory depth, or if it is a unique effect resistant to corrections.
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APPENDIX A 
[ALL POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR STUDY] 
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A June 26, 2015, study in the local newspaper Billings Herald reported the discovery of a 
cave formation that scientists have not yet explained. The authors of the study, Danica 
and Frith, gave a description of the unusual formation: The otherwise ordinary stalactites 
generate a continuous humming sound without being touched. The authors do not yet 
understand how they work and provided no explanation of the underlying process. The 
study described how the stalactites were discovered and discussed further directions of 
research to be conducted at the University of Pittsburgh. 
 
A November 13, 2016, study in the journal Science reported the discovery of a naturally 
occurring stone that scientists have thoroughly explained. The authors of the 
study, Stevens and Melora, gave a description of the strange rock: The seemingly 
common desert stone turns into a liquid state when it comes into contact with water. The 
authors fully understand how it works and went on to provide a complete explanation of 
the underlying process. The study described how the stone was discovered and discussed 
further directions of research to be conducted at Texas A&M University. 
 
A June 26, 2015, study in the journal Science reported the discovery of a cave formation 
that scientists have thoroughly explained. The authors of the study, Danica and Frith, 
gave a description of the unusual formation: The otherwise ordinary stalactites generate a 
continuous humming sound without being touched. The authors fully understand how 
they work and went on to provide a complete explanation of the underlying process. The 
study described how the stalactites were discovered and discussed further directions of 
research to be conducted at the University of Pittsburgh. 
 
A November 13, 2016, study in the local newspaper Billings Herald reported the 
discovery of a naturally occurring stone that scientists have not yet explained. The 
authors of the study, Stevens and Melora, gave a description of the strange rock: The 
seemingly common desert stone turns into a liquid state when it comes into contact with 
water. The authors do not yet understand how it works and provided no explanation of 
the underlying process. The study described how the stone was discovered and discussed 
further directions of research to be conducted at Texas A&M University. 
 
A June 26, 2015, study in the journal Science reported the discovery of a cave formation 
that scientists have not yet explained. The authors of the study, Danica and Frith, gave a 
description of the unusual formation: The otherwise ordinary stalactites generate a 
continuous humming sound without being touched. The authors do not yet understand 
how they work and provided no explanation of the underlying process. The study 
described how the stalactites were discovered and discussed further directions of research 
to be conducted at the University of Pittsburgh. 
 
A November 13, 2016, study in the local newspaper Billings Herald reported the 
discovery of a naturally occurring stone that scientists have thoroughly explained. The 
  41 
authors of the study, Stevens and Melora, gave a description of the strange rock: The 
seemingly common desert stone turns into a liquid state when it comes into contact with 
water. The authors fully understand how it works and went on to provide a complete 
explanation of the underlying process. The study described how the stone was discovered 
and discussed further directions of research to be conducted at Texas A&M University.  
 
A June 26, 2015, study in the local newspaper Billings Herald reported the discovery of a 
cave formation that scientists have thoroughly explained. The authors of the study, 
Danica and Frith, gave a description of the unusual formation: The otherwise ordinary 
stalactites generate a continuous humming sound without being touched. The authors 
fully understand how they work and went on to provide a complete explanation of the 
underlying process. The study described how the stalactites were discovered and 
discussed further directions of research to be conducted at the University of Pittsburgh. 
 
A November 13, 2016, study in the journal Science reported the discovery of a naturally 
occurring stone that scientists have not yet explained. The authors of the study, Stevens 
and Melora, gave a description of the strange rock: The seemingly common desert stone 
turns into a liquid state when it comes into contact with water. The authors do not yet 
understand how it works and provided no explanation of the underlying process. The 
study described how the stone was discovered and discussed further directions of 
research to be conducted at Texas A&M University. 
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APPENDIX B 
[DEPENDENT MEASURES PRESENTED AFTER NEWS BRIEF] 
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Please answer the following questions, thinking about the scenario you just read. 
 
Not well at 
all (1) 
Slightly well 
(2) 
Somewhat 
well (3) 
Very well 
(4) 
Extremely 
well (5) 
How well do I 
understand 
how this 
phenomenon 
works? (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
How well 
could I 
explain how 
this 
phenomenon 
works? (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
How well do I 
trust the 
source that 
published the 
research? (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
How well do I 
believe that 
this 
phenomenon 
exists? (4)  
o  o  o  o  o  
How well 
could any 
person 
understand 
how this 
phenomenon 
works? (5)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Did you receive an explanation on how these stalactites are able to produce a humming 
sound? 
 
No 
explanation 
at all (1) 
  (2)   (3)   (4) 
A complete, 
thorough 
explanation 
(5) 
Did you 
receive an 
explanation? 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
